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Abstract 
 
Managing information resources including 
protecting the privacy of customer data plays a critical 
role in most firms. Data breach incidents may be 
extremely costly for firms. In the face of a data breach 
event, some firms are reluctant to disclose information 
to the public. Firm may be concerned with the 
potential drop in the market value following the 
revelation of a data breach. This paper examines the 
impact of data breach incidents to the firm’s market 
value/equity value, and explores the possibility that 
certain firm behaviors may reduce the cost of the 
incidents. We use regression analysis to identify the 
factors that affect cumulative abnormal stock return 
(CAR). Our results indicate that when data breach 
happens, firms not only should notify customers or the 
public timely, but also try to control the amount of 
information disclosed. These findings should provide 
corporate executives with guidance on managing 
public disclosure of data breach incidents.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
      As the information technology in business 
develops, many companies store and process large sets 
of customer data, which may include sensitive personal 
information. Incidents of data breaches that reveal 
company secrets or confidential client information can 
affect the firm seriously [1][17]. Leakage of sensitive 
information may cause customers to lose trust in the 
company and lead to the loss of a firm’s market value 
[1]. Several studies have demonstrated the impacts of 
data breach incidents on stock price [1][15][17]. These 
studies show that data breach announcements lead to 
significant negative market return. For example, 
Telang and Wattel [25] evaluate the impact of software  
vulnerability announcement on firms, and find that 
firms will lose 0.6% of their market value.  Cavusoglu 
et al. [9] conclude that firms lose 2.1% of their market 
value within two days after the announcement of a 
breach event. Several studies state that the exposure of 
confidential data will result in negative CAR 
[1][15][17].  
      Different characteristics of data breach events have 
been identified in the previous literature. Researchers 
extract different characteristics of these incidents and 
evaluate their impacts to firm’s market value. They 
find that some of the variables have very significant 
impacts on the stock return. Some of the recent studies 
are listed in Table 1. As shown in Table 1, researchers 
have mainly focused on evaluating the impacts of 
breach types, time, firm’s characteristics and types of 
industry to firm’s market value. Chai et al. [26] 
evaluate the SOX law’s impact to the market reaction 
and conclude that CAR is more positive after the law.  
Firms that belong to different industries will have 
different market reactions to breach events. CAR due 
to information security breach is larger for BSFI 
(Business, financial, service, insurance) firms [19]. 
Internet specific companies suffer more on stock value 
after security breach incidents [2]. 
      Although there are extensive empirical studies on 
the impacts of breach types, industry types and firm 
characteristics on firm’s market value, little is known 
about the firm’s actions toward data breach incidents, 
and how investors react to firms’ actions. Our paper 
differs from previous studies in that we aim to examine 
whether the variations of market reactions can be 
explained by the firm actions after the breach events 
(see Table 1). In the face of data breach events, 
different companies may take different actions. The 
content of news media may reflect these actions. But 
from the literature review, we find that few papers 
mention possible firm actions toward the data breach 
events and their impacts to firms’ equity value.       
      According to previous literature [13] and our 
observation of data breach incidents, we know that 
some firms are reluctant to disclose information about 
data breaches to their customers or the public. Firms 
may be concerned with the potential drop in firm 
equity value following the revelation of a data breach. 
In this paper, we believe whether the firm chose to 
disclose information to the public after the data breach
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 Table 1 Summaries of previous literature and comparison with this paper 
Categories Variables Studies Findings 
Breach type 
Vulnerabilities of 
software Telang and Wattel (2007) Lose 0.6% market value 
Availability Gordon (2011) CAR significantly impacted by breach type availability 
Exposure of 
confidential data 
Acquisti et al. and Gatzlaff (2006) Negative CAR 
Gatzlaff, K. M., & McCullough, K. 
A. (2010) Negative CAR 
Campbell et al. (2003) Negative CAR 
Time 
Before or after law 
(SOX) Chai et al. (2011) CAR more positive after the law 
Earlier discovery of 
breaches Cavusoglu et al. (2004) Earlier discovery is better 
Before or after 911 
Gordon (2011) Pre 911 significant, after not 
Telang and Wattel (2007) Pre 911 not significant, after 911 significantly negative 
       Firm 
characteristics 
Firm Competitiveness Telang and Wattel (2007) Significantly negative 
Firm Size 
Das et al. (2012) CAR is larger for smaller firms 
Cavusoglu et al. (2004) Smaller firms lose more 
Acquisti et al. (2006) Large companies have positive CAR 
Firm Growth Goldstein et.al (2011) Negatively affected by security breach 
Type of 
industry 
Internet specific 
industry 
Das et al. (2012) CAR due to IS breach is larger for internet firms 
Cavusoglu et al. (2004) Internet firms lose big 
A. Hovava and J. D’Arcy (2003) Internet specific company suffer more 
BFSI (Business, 
financial, service, 
insurance) 
Das et al. (2012) CAR due to IS breach is larger for BSFI firms 
SIC60/62 
Leung and Bose (2008) Negatively affected by security breach 
Goldstein et.al (2011) Negatively associated with CAR 
Severity 
Number of individuals 
affected Acquisti et al. (2006) >100000 significant 
Number of records 
breached This paper CAR significantly negative 
 Damage potency Telang and Wattel (2007) 
More severe significantly 
negative 
 
Firm actions 
(not related to 
events) 
Clustering the textual 
contents of information 
security in 10-K report 
Tawei Wang et al. (2013) 
Significant if disclosing security 
risk factor with action-oriented 
terms in 10-K 
 Investment for IT security improvement Chai et al. (2011) Positive CAR 
Firm reactions 
related to 
events 
Provide patches Telang and Wattel (2007) CAR significantly positive 
Notify customer or 
public This paper CAR significantly Positive 
More event 
information disclosed This paper CAR significantly Negative 
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 is a strategic action. This decision may determine the 
change of market value of the firm. 
       In order to obtain information about the different 
firm actions after the data breach events, we utilize 
data collected by The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse1. 
This database provides a description of each data 
breach event. We find that whether the firm initiates to 
disclose data breach information to the public can be 
revealed from the textual contents of the description. 
We seek to discover whether this type of firm action 
will impact the firm’s market value during the data 
breach event period.2 Using content analysis on the 
description of the data breach events, we evaluate 
whether the results will have impacts on the firm’s 
equity value through an empirical study. Our findings 
on the anticipated market reaction should provide 
corporate executives with guidance on managing 
public disclosure of data breach incidents.  
      The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After 
the introduction, four hypotheses are derived in Section 
2. We then describe the data collection process and 
methodology in Section 3. Next, we analyze the textual 
data of the disclosed information about the data breach 
events and present the results of data analysis and 
implications in Section 4. Finally, we conclude the 
paper with a discussion of contributions, limitations 
and future research in Section 5.   
 
2. Theoretical backgrounds and hypotheses 
development 
 
      Previous event studies [1][15][17] show that the 
announcement of a data breach incident will cause a 
negative effect to firm’s market value. But no literature 
considers the firm’s decision to notify the data breach 
event to customers or the public as a factor to impact 
the market return. In our view, timely disclosure can be 
used to reduce the legal and reputation cost of bad 
news [25]. Firm’s disclosure behavior also prevents 
competitors from unambiguously inferring that these 
firms are hiding information [8]. A previous study 
shows that voluntary disclosure of bad news is a 
special type of disclosure sometimes necessary for 
firms [22]. Other studies find that stock price responses 
to voluntary disclosures vary [8][24]. As mentioned 
                                                
1 It is a nationally recognized consumer education and advocacy 
nonprofit dedicated to protecting the privacy of American consumers. 
Data were collected from http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach 
2 The information on the database is usually updated 1 or 2 days after 
the event happened. From our observation, we think the content of 
the event description usually can reflect the main information that 
was related to the event. We assume the description of the events can 
reflect some actions performed by the breach company 1 or 2 days 
after the data breach. 	  
previously, most firms seek to withhold data breach 
information in fear that the breach disclosure may 
affect their market value. Early research in Accounting 
shows that firms chose to disclose only when it can 
maximize their profit [28]. We believe that although 
data breach announcements may lead to negative 
market reactions, if a firm initiates the notification to 
their customers or the public early, the result could be 
different since this will add confidence to the investors 
due to timely disclosure. Even though companies could 
try to withhold the breach information, the events may 
be disclosed by other news media, which may cause 
the investors to lose trust in the company.  
      However, although we believe that a firm would 
benefit from voluntary disclosure of data breach 
events, the effect may not be equal for all the events. 
The severity of the event would weaken the benefit of 
voluntary disclosure. Previous research shows that if 
the breach announcement suggests that the breach is 
severe, it could cause a significantly negative impact to 
the firm’s CAR [25]. We believe the disclosure of a 
data breach event with larger data record loss could 
lead to more negative confidence on a firm’s security 
controls. The notification of severe data breach events 
could damage a firm’s reputation and cause loss in 
share price. Therefore, the benefit of voluntary 
disclosure would depend on the severity of the event. 
We believe that the number of records breached could 
be a good proxy to measure the severity of the data 
breach event. Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
      H1a: Firms’ early initiation of notifications to 
customers or the public about data breach incidents 
will positively affect CAR. 
 
      H1b: Higher number of breached records would 
weaken the positive effect that voluntarily disclosure 
would bring. 
  
      The amount of breach related information to 
disclose is another issue that firm managers need to 
consider. To determine the amount and type of 
information to disclose, firms face a number of trade-
offs. Better disclosure can increase investor awareness 
of the firm and hence reduce the cost of capital and 
increase equity valuation [5]. According to Berglöf and 
Pajuste [5], when providing firm information to 
shareholders, better performing firms should disclose 
more. Greater disclosure benefits the firms with good 
news, but the effect is exact opposite for firms with bad 
news to disclose [29]. It suggests that the disclosure of 
more bad news information may carry direct financial 
costs to the firm. Research also shows that there are 
increased costs from increased transparency [13]. 
Based on the previous research, we believe that firms 
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 have to weigh the costs and benefits of the amount of 
information disclosed to the public. We think that for 
bad news like data breach incidents, too much 
information disclosure may signal higher severity and 
cost to remedy the incident and may cause negative 
impact to the company’s equity value. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
 
       H2: More information disclosed related to the data 
breach events will lead to more negative CAR. 
 
       By studying 79 breach events, Acquisti et al. [1] 
states that a breach of more than 100,000 subjects will 
reduce the return on stock price by 1.2%. A company’s 
costs for data breach events depend on the number of 
individuals whose information has been compromised. 
Telang and Wattel [25] manually categorize breach 
events as severe or not, and find that the security 
breach events categorized as severe could cause a 
significantly negative impact to the firm’s CAR. As 
mentioned earlier, we believe that the number of 
records breached could be used to measure the severity 
of the data breach event. Larger data record loss could 
lead to larger financial losses due to litigation and 
remedy measures. Thus we have: 
 
      H3: The number of records breached will 
negatively affect the CAR. 
 
      Repeated disclosure of severe data breaches and 
newspaper headlines could lead to a significant 
reputation damage and loss in share price [1]. We 
believe that for severe data breach events, exposure of 
larger amount of event related information may draw 
investors more attention on the severity of breach 
events, and more likely lead to loss in reputation and 
investor trust.  If both the amount of event related 
information disclosed and breach records are in 
relatively high levels, we expect that negative 
cumulative abnormal market return would be higher 
than if there were higher amount of event information 
disclosed but a lower number of breach records. We 
would also expect that negative CAR would be lower if 
there are low levels of both the amount of information 
disclosed and breach records. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
 
      H4: Higher amount of breach event related 
information disclosed and higher number of breached 
records will cause more negative CAR to a company 
than otherwise.   
   
3. Data collection and methodology 
 
3.1. Data collection 
 
      Our data collection consists of a two-step process. 
First we use data breach events provided by Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse. The information of Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse is obtained from verifiable media 
sources, government web sites, or blog posts with 
information pertinent to the breach incidents in 
question. The database contains a chronology of data 
breach incidents from 2005 to present. We use the 
events that happened between 2005 and 2015. There are 
4712 events collected from the database during this 
time period. The data breach events are included in our 
sample if the firms are public trading companies in the 
USA. After filtering, we included 517 events. Then, in 
order to verify the data sources, we also extracted 
events from news articles using keyword searching in 
Factiva. We collected news articles about these public 
trading firms that have breach announcements reported 
in major news media during the 10-year window. We 
searched in the Factiva database and used the following 
terms: (1) data breach, (2) hack, (3) virus, (4) privacy 
breach, (5) cyber attack, (6) unauthorized access, (7) 
data theft, (8) identity theft, (9) phishing, (10) denial of 
service. This method is similar to one used in previous 
studies [15][16][32] for finding breach events. After 
this process, we identified 101 data breach events that 
happened to firms traded in the USA. We find that in all 
case the 101 events are included the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse database within 1 or 2 days after the 
event happened. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of events by year 
Year Number of Events 
2005 25 
2006 71 
2007 63 
2008 30 
2009 22 
2010 77 
2011 47 
2012 60 
2013 63 
2014 48 
2015 24 
 
3.1. Methodology 
 
In this paper, we use the event study method to 
compute the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), based 
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 on a sample of 517 data breach events that happened to     
the publicly traded companies in the US. Event study 
methodology has been used extensively in 
management science and finance to measure the impact 
of various corporate events [1][15][27]. To better 
compare our results to the previous research, we used 
similar methodology applied in earlier event studies 
about market reactions to breach events [1][21][25].  
      We estimate CAR using the four-factor model 
[6][20]. Several studies have estimated abnormal 
returns using the four-factor model [30][33]. The four-
factor model posits a linear relationship between the 
stock return and four factors over a given time period 
(Formula 1): 
 
Rit =αi + Rft +βi1[Rmt − Rft ]+βi2SMBt
+βi3HMLt +βi4UMDt +εit
                         (1) 
 
where Rit is the return of stock i on day t, αi is the 
intercept of the relationship for stock i, Rft is the risk-
free return on day t, Rmt is the return on the market 
portfolio on day t, SMBt is the small minus big size 
portfolio return on day t, HMLt is the high minus low 
book-to-market portfolio return on day t, UMDt is the 
past-one-year winners-minus-losers stock portfolio 
return on day t, and εit is the error term [14]. Abnormal 
returns are defined as the difference between the actual 
return and an estimated expected return in the absence 
of an event. The estimation window is generally 
between 120 days and 200 days. In our case, we define 
a 200-day estimation period, starting at day -200 until 
day -11 before the event announcement. We end the 
estimation period 10 trading days prior to the event 
day. 
Using OLS regression over the estimation period of 
200 trading days, we estimate the parameters of the 
four-factor model. The abnormal return ARit for firm i 
on day t is the difference between the actual and the 
expected return. The abnormal return from the four-
factor model is as follows: 
 
ARit = Rit − (αˆi + Rft + βˆi1[Rmt − Rft ]+
βˆi2SMBt + βˆi3HMLt + βˆi4UMDt +εit
              (2) 
 
Since we have N observations (N = 517 events), the 
mean abnormal return across all observations can be 
calculated as At = ARit
i=1
N
∑ . The cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) for a given time period can be calculate 
using 
 
                      CAR[t1, t2 ]= At
t=t1
t2
∑                               (3)                                                                                                                           
The period of interest for which we conduct the event 
study is known as event window. The date of 
announcement is defined as day 0. In practice, the 
event window often includes day 0 and day 1.  By 
using Formula 3, we calculate the CAR for the event 
over the event window.  
 
4. Results  
 
Our interest in this paper is to explore whether firm 
actions toward the breach events will have impacts on 
the market reactions to the incidents. For each of the 
517 events we collected, we calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) using event window of day 0 
and day 1. The CAR results are used as a dependent 
variable in our analysis. After estimating the CAR, a 
regression analysis is conducted to investigate the 
possible factors behind a firm’s market value loss. In 
the regression model, we control firm size, firm 
industry, and breach time, which are often found by 
previous research to be associated with abnormal 
market return [12][18][32]. We also consider several 
factors that rarely appear in data breach event studies 
including whether firm initiates the notification to the 
public, the amount of information disclosed and 
number of records breached.  
We analyze the language used in the event 
description collected by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
database. According to our observation of the event 
description data for the 517 events, we believe that the 
event description can reflect the main information that 
relates to the event. When measuring whether a firm 
initiates the notification to the public, we look at 
whether the description contains “notify”, “inform”, 
“announce”, “disclose”, “release” and similar words. 
(Table 3) D_Notify is 1 if the event description 
contains these words and without negative vocabulary 
before them. D_Notify is 0 otherwise. For the 517 
events, 121 of the events are marked as 1 for D_Notify. 
We also look at the length of the description; we think 
that the longer length suggests more information of the 
events were disclosed. At last, we measure the impact 
of breached records. In our analysis, the logarithmic 
transformation is used to measure the length of the 
description and the number of records breached.  
We develop three regression models. The variables 
we observe and the definitions are listed in Table 4. 
The results of the regression model are listed in Table 
5. In all three models, VIF values for our variables 
ranged from 1.03 and 1.46, below the VIF value of 10. 
So our models don’t have the concern for 
multicollinearity. A comparison of Models 1, 2 and 3 
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 suggests that the variables promoted by this paper will 
better indicate the market reaction toward data breach 
events. 
 
Table 3:  Sample events with or without firm initiated notification
 
      The first model we only use the control variables 
raised by previous studies. The model equation: 
 
CAR[t1, t2 ]= β0 +β1Firm_ Size+β2Industry_BSR+
β3Industry_BSF +β4Time+ε
(4) 
 
The result in Model 1 is very similar to the previous 
studies. Larger firm size will have significant positive 
impact on firm’s performance after the breach. 
Negative CAR due to data breach is larger for firm 
belongs to business, financial and insurance industry. 
The year 2008 to 2009 is significant negative. 
      Using Model 2, we evaluate the firm action related 
variable D_Notify. We tested the statistical 
significance of firm’s action of initiate the notification 
of data breach. The result indicates the market 
reactions to data breach after taking into consideration 
of firm behavior.   We control the variables in Model 
1. The model equation is: 
 
CAR[t1, t2 ]= β0 +β1D_Notify+β2D_ Length+
β3D_Record +β4Firm_ Size+
β5Industry_BSR+β6Industry_BSF
+β7Time+ε
      (5)                                                          
 
Table 5 shows the coefficient estimate for D_Notify 
(0.0029). The significant positive coefficient of 
D_Notify suggests that when the firm initiates the 
notification to customers or the public, there is a 
Date public Company Keywords Description 
3/2/15 Natural Grocers Announce Natural Grocers announced a possible data breach of its 
customer payment cards. The grocery retailer claims they have 
not received any reports or complaints… 
1/5/15 Morgan Stanley Notify An employee of Morgan Stanley stole customer information on 
350,000 clients including account numbers…The employee has 
since been fired and the bank is notifying all of the individuals 
affected…. 
9/2/14 The Home Depot Announce The Home Depot has announced the data breach they suffered 
earlier this month has affected approximately 56 million credit and 
debit cards. This makes this breach the second largest breach 
ever… 
5/24/12 General 
Communication  
Inc. (GCI) 
Notify A former customer service representative gathered account 
information directly from two customers…. GCI decided to notify 
all other customers who may have been contacted by the 
dishonest former employee…. 
6/9/11 Citibank Release Hackers have managed to access the information of 
approximately 1% of Citibank's 21 million users… Citibank 
released an official statement on the Citigroup website… 
9/21/07 
 
Citigroup      / Three spreadsheets containing 5,200 Social Security numbers 
and other personal details about customers were inadvertently 
leaked over an online file-sharing network by a former employee. 
Tiversa, a company that monitors P2P networks, found Excel 
spreadsheets from the desktop of a financial analyst at ABN. 
Although Tiversa found over 10,000 files, deduplication revealed 
only 5,208 unique Social Security numbers, along with names and 
what type of mortgage each customer had. 
8/12/08 Wells Fargo Notify Wells Fargo is notifying customers that hackers have accessed 
their confidential personal data by illegally using its access codes. 
Personal information including names, addresses… 
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statistically significant positive market reaction. We 
measure the amount of event related information 
disclosed using D_Length (-0.0088). The significant 
negative coefficient of D_Length suggests that if too 
much event related information is disclosed to the 
public, it will have negative impact on a firm’s market 
reaction. Model 2 adds number of records breached as 
another variable to test the market reaction. With 
coefficient at -0.0007 and p-value less than 0.05, the 
results indicate that the market reaction is significantly 
negative toward the number of records that was 
breached in a data breach event. Thus the results 
support our Hypothesis 1a, 2 and 3. 
In Model 3, we add interaction term 
D_Notify*D_Record to measure whether the 
interaction between voluntary disclosure and breach 
record would cause impact on CAR. With coefficient 
at -0.0013 and p-value less than 0.05, we conclude that 
larger number of breached records would weaken the 
positive effect of voluntarily disclosure. We also add 
D_Length*D_Record to evaluate whether the 
interaction between the amount of event related 
information disclosed and the number of records 
breached have more negative impact on a firm’s CAR. 
With p-value <0.0001, we conclude that the impact of 
D_Length on abnormal return depends on the level of 
D_Record significantly. The coefficient estimate 
(Table 5) for D_Length*D_Record (-0.0028) suggests 
that D_Length will enhance the negative impact of 
D_Record and vice versa. We conclude that firms with 
larger number of records breached and more event 
related information disclosure will have greater 
negative CAR. Thus Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 4 
are supported.  
 
Table 4:  Model Variables and Definitions 
 
 Variables Definition and Calculation 
Dependent 
Variable CAR [t1,t2] 
Cumulative abnormal return over [0,1] event window, measured in 
percentages 
Independent 
Variables 
D_Notify Dummy variable equals to 1 if firm initiates the notification of data breach event 
D_Length 
The length of the event description, indicating the amount of event 
information disclosed. Values have been transformed using the 
logarithm function. 
N_Record The number of records breached in the data breach event. Values have been transformed using the logarithm function. 
 
D_Notify*D_Record 
 
 
D_Length*D_Record 
 
 
The interaction term between voluntarily initiates the notification of 
data breach event and the number of records breached. 
The interaction term between the length of the event description and 
the number of records breached. 
 
Control 
Variables 
                  
 
Firm_Size 
 
Total assets of the firm. Values have been transformed using the 
logarithm function. 
Industry_BSF Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm belong to Business- financial and insurance service 
Industry_BSR  Dummy variable equals to 1 if firm belong to Business-Retail/Merchant 
Time Measure whether it is year 2008-2009. 
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Table 5: CAR Regression Results Given the Characteristics of the Data Breach Events 
 
Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Coefficient(t-statistic) Coefficient(t-statistic) Coefficient(t-statistic) 
Intercept 0.0043(-1.48) 0.0107(2.36)** 0.0046(0.99) 
D_Notify  0.0029(1.97)** 0.0033(2.23)** 
D_Length  -0.0088(-4.15)*** -0.0051(-2.30)** 
N_Record  -0.0007(-2.31)** -0.0002(-0.73) 
D_Notify*D_Record   -0.0013(-2.15)** 
D_Length*D_Record   -0.0028(-3.82)*** 
Firm_Size 0.0013(1.79)** 0.0015(2.32)** 0.0013(2.22)** 
Industry_BSF -0.0023(-1.55) -0.0026(-1.74)* -0.0021(-1.47) 
Industry_BSR 0.0011(0.73) 0.0014(0.92) 0.0017(1.15) 
Time 0.01(-4.67)*** -0.0101(-4.67)*** -0.0095(-4.54)*** 
R2 0.06 0.10 0.15 
N Observations 517 517 517 
      
      *Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% 
 
5. Discussions and Future Research 
 
We believe that our study offers a worthwhile 
contribution to the existed literature. We find new 
factors that can indicate some types of firm actions 
toward data breach event. By looking at the result of 
our investigation, we think that firms can take possible 
managerial controls on data breaches. Our finding 
indicates that the market will reward firms that take the 
action to notify the customers immediately after the 
breach event. The results show that firms that initiate 
the notification of data breach event timely will have a 
positive impact on the market return. However, 
although voluntary disclosure of data breach events can 
have a positive effect to CAR, larger number of breach 
records would weaken the effect. The observation can 
provide help when firms face the dilemma that 
disclosure of data breach event may cause damage to 
the firm’s public image. We also investigate the 
association between the amount of information that 
was disclosed to the public and market reaction. We 
believe that greater amount of event related 
information disclosure will lead to more negative stock 
reaction. We further find that firms with both larger 
amount of event related information disclosed and 
larger breached records will have greater negative 
market reaction. We find that market tends to punish 
more for the firms when the amount of event related 
information and number of records both increased. 
Although firms may not be able to manipulate the 
amount of information available to the public related to 
the data breach event, firms may have some extent of 
controls over the information that will be disclosed to 
the public. We believe this result is useful in helping 
firms design their proper incident response planning 
strategies. When a larger number of records was 
breached in the event, firm should disclose less event 
related information to the public in less regulated 
industries.  
      The limitation of our study mainly lies in the data 
we used. This paper used the event description 
collected and updated by the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse database. The descriptions are the 
secondary sources collected from news media, 
government site or blogs. This may not reflect all the 
information that investors may take into consideration. 
Future research may build on our results and perhaps 
validate our findings through more comprehensive sets 
of data. Second, the keywords we are using may not 
reflect all the firm’s voluntarily disclosure behavior. 
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Some actions performed by firms toward data breach 
event could be missing from our data. In the future, we 
will improve our categorization scheme and have more 
comprehensive analyses on the firm actions. Third, 
when calculating the CAR, we didn’t use control firms 
as a benchmark. We plan to add this in our future 
work. Fourth, this paper only measures short-term 
market reaction around the breach date. However, 
more information regarding to the data breach 
incidents may be added in follow-up news articles, 
which we did not consider in this study. This will be 
addressed in our future work.  
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